Religion Is Special Enough by Lund, Christopher C.
Wayne State University 
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School 
1-1-2017 
Religion Is Special Enough 
Christopher C. Lund 
Wayne State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp 
 Part of the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 Va. L. Rev. 481, 524 (2017) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@WayneState. 
RELIGION IS SPECIAL ENOUGH
Christopher C. Lund*
In ways almost beyond counting, our legal system treats religion dif-
ferently, subjecting it both to certain protections and certain disabili-
ties. Developing the specifics of those protections and disabilities,
along with more general theories tying the specifics together and jus-
tifying them collectively, has long been the usual stuff of debate
among courts and commentators.
Those debates still continue. But in recent years, increasingly people
have asked a slightly different question-whether religion should be
singled out for special treatment at all, in any context, for any pur-
pose. Across the board, but especially in the context of religious ex-
emptions from generally applicable laws, many have come to doubt
religion's distinctiveness. And traditional defenses of religion's dis-
tinctiveness have been rejected as unpersuasive or religiously parti-
san.
This Article offers a defense of our legal tradition and its special
treatment of religion. Religious freedom can be justified on religion-
neutral grounds; it serves the same kinds of values as other rights
(like freedom of speech). And while religion as a category may not
perfectly correspond to the underlying values that religious freedom
serves, that kind of mismatch happens commonly with other rights and
is probably inevitable. Ultimately, religious liberty makes sense as one
important liberty within the pantheon of human freedoms. Religion
may not be uniquely special, but it is special enough.
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INTRODUCTION
A MERICAN law treats religion as special. The First Amendment
singles religion out as a constitutional matter, and so too do count-
less statutes, administrative regulations, and more informal government
practices. For a long time, the distinctive treatment of religion went un-
tested and sometimes unnoticed. America inherited a constitutional text
and tradition of religious liberty, and people are always slow to recon-
sider what they have long taken for granted.
Virtually every case involving the Religion Clauses carries with it
questions about religion's distinctiveness. With the Free Exercise
Clause, the persistently recurring issue has been whether the government
should provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. But
why should the Native American Church have some special right to use
peyote in its religious rituals when doing so would ordinarily violate the
drug laws?' With the Establishment Clause, the issues are more varied,
but religion's distinctiveness is still a common theme. If a city hall can
display a flag, why not a cross?2 If the public schools can teach evolu-
1 See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (reject-
ing the claim that the Native American Church is constitutionally entitled to such an exemp-
tion).
2 See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010) (explaining that "[t]he [Establishment]
Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of
city hall" (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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tion, why not creationism?3 If Congress can bail Chrysler out of bank-
ruptcy, why not a Catholic diocese?
4
Such questions now stand front and center in conversations about the
meaning of the Religion Clauses. Five years ago, for example, the Court
considered whether churches have a special constitutional immunity
from employment claims brought by their clergy-the so-called ministe-
rial exception.5 Twenty years earlier, in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Court had said that the First Amendment generally did not require
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.6 And so naturally
the Solicitor General argued, following Smith, that religious groups were
not entitled to any exemptions beyond those available to nonreligious
groups. But the Court unanimously rejected that position, calling it "ex-
traordinary" and "amazing" at oral argument,7 and then dismissing it in
the subsequent opinion as "remarkable" and "hard to square with the
text of the First Amendment ... which gives special solicitude to the
rights of religious organizations."8 This term, in Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia v. Pauley, the Supreme Court will decide the fate of
a Missouri program that gives money to schools to resurface their play-
grounds but categorically excludes religious schools from participation.9
Singling out religion that way may be constitutionally forbidden, consti-
tutionally required, or neither required nor forbidden. But no matter how
the Court resolves the case, religion's distinctiveness is precisely the
question the Court must decide.
This debate rages not only in the courts but in the academy as well.
Among academics, the debate has taken a tum-a turn reflecting in-
3 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (rejecting Louisiana's Creationism
Act that required public schools to teach creationism alongside evolution); cf. Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 763 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (requiring that public
schools not teach intelligent design).
4 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995) (noting
that "a tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches ... would run con-
trary to Establishment Clause concerns dating from the earliest days of the Republic").
5 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
6 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 ("[Our] decisions have consistently held that the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."').
7 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 37, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-553).
8 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
9 788 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016).
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creased skepticism of religion's distinctiveness. In recent years, some of
the most distinguished voices in legal scholarship--scholars like Ronald
Dworkin, Christopher Eisgruber, Lawrence Sager, Brian Leiter, and Mi-
cah Schwartzman-have suggested that the law should abandon special
treatment of religion altogether.1° Much of the work has been directed at
religious exemptions, which have been seen as undeservedly privileging
religious commitments-a kind of discrimination against those whose
fundamental commitments are nonreligious in nature.11 These scholars
have been joined by academics outside the legal academy who have
come to the same conclusion, whether in political science reviews, phi-
losophy journals, or other academic fora.12 As Kent Greenawalt has put
it, "whether and why religion should be treated as special" has become
the "daunting challenge" of our age.13
Sometimes academic debates are only of interest to academics, but
not so here. Last year, taking note of the controversy, Justice Samuel
Alito openly wondered about the future of special protections for reli-
gion:
There's an anomaly about our current situation .... While a
great many people believe very strongly that there are rights that
government must respect, our understanding of the source of those
10 See Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God 137 (2013); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 52 (2007); Brian Leiter, Why
Tolerate Religion? 7 (2013); Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1351, 1427 (2012).
11 To be sure, there has long been a trickle of folks expressing doubt that religion is spe-
cial. For some of the best early examples, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Founda-
tion: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
555, 572 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommoda-
tion of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75,
78 (1990); William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of the
Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 Ind.
L.J. 193, 193 (2000).12 Just the titles of the following pieces convey the extraordinary amount of attention given
to this issue. See, e.g., Sonu Bedi, Debate: What is so Special About Religion? The Dilemma
of the Religious Exemption, 15 J. Pol. Phil. 235 (2007); Gemma Cornelissen, Belief-Based
Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?, 25 Ratio Juris 85 (2012); Anthony Ellis, What
Is Special About Religion?, 25 Law & Phil. 219 (2006); see also Kenneth Einar Himma,
What's So Damn Special About Religion, Anyway?, 33 Law & Phil. 525, 526 (2014) (re-
viewing Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (2012)); Andrew Koppelman, Is it Fair to
Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 571; Schwartzman, supra note 10.
13 Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on
Some Critiques, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1131, 1138 (2010).
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rights has been obscured. That we understand that they come from
our creator has become obscure, and it's questionable as to whether
they'll be able to endure without their historical roots.
14
This theme pervades the literature. Religious freedom makes sense in a
religious world. But if society becomes increasingly secular, religious
exemptions will become vestigial remnants of a bygone era, indefensible
and eventually incomprehensible.5
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I addresses some commonly
asserted arguments as to why religion should be thought special, ulti-
mately finding them insufficient. Quid pro quo arguments, which con-
ceptualize the Religion Clauses as counterweights to each other, offer
pragmatic reasons for religious toleration. But they presume the thing
that needs to be proved-namely that religion is sufficiently distinctive
in some regard. Similarly, religious arguments for eligious liberty may
work for religious audiences. But because their value depends on con-
testable religious premises, they will not even work for all religious be-
lievers and have little hope of persuading nonreligious audiences.
Part II offers an affirmative account in defense of religious liberty. It
emphasizes certain features of religion: its importance to individuals, its
chronic misuse by government, the value of religious liberty to ethnic
and cultural minorities, and the civil peace that freedom of religion has
brought to the Western world. It defends the fact that religion as a cate-
gory seems both underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to all of
these values, pointing out that such mismatch is practically inevitable
and that other constitutional rights (like freedom of speech) suffer from
precisely the same failing.
14 Maria Wiering, U.S. Needs Founding Fathers' Religious Liberty Vision, Alito Tells MD
Lawyers, Cath. Rev. (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.catholicreview.org/article/news/local-news/
u-s-needs-founding-fathers-religious-liberty-vision-alito-tells-md-lawyers [https://perma.cc/
NF5D-KP6Z].
15 Despairing of this situation, Steven Smith sees only two ways forward: We "resist the
constraints of secular discourse, and ... defend [religion] ... in some contemporary version
of the traditional theological terms," or we conclude "there simply is no good justification
for treating religion as a special legal category." Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk:
The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1869, 1884 (2009) (reviewing Kent
Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution (2008)); see also Note, Wagering on Religious
Liberty, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 946, 946 (2003) ("The old justifications for religious liberty no
longer have the force that they once did, and our current discourse has yet to find a plausible
way of defending religious liberty in terms that convey the same conviction." (quoting Frie-
drich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 1 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2017] 485
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Part III turns to the argument that the law should abandon protections
for religion in favor of protections for some larger secular category that
happens to include religion without being limited to it-such as the cat-
egory of moral conscience or the more amorphous category of deep-and-
valuable human commitments. For reasons that Part III explains, though
obstacles will have to be overcome, moral conscience is indeed worth
protecting. Yet moral conscience and religion end up being quite differ-
ent categories-neither of which subsumes the other. Thus, for reasons
that Part III also explains, protections for moral conscience should sup-
plement, rather than supplant, protections for religion. Similarly, the no-
tion that we protect all deep-and-valuable human commitments is quite
appealing. But in the context of a written constitution that relies so heav-
ily on categorization, the way to protect deep-and-valuable human
commitments is by naming particular deep-and-valuable human com-
mitments-and, on almost any account, that would have to include reli-
gion.
Part IV turns to the specific subject of religious exemptions, unpack-
ing the reasons why protections for religion as a category in general end
up justifying religious exemptions in particular. And Part V offers some
brief thoughts in conclusion.
For too long, the debate over whether religion is special has proceed-
ed in a strange vacuum, as if religion were the only right protected by
the Constitution. When one considers the incredible variety of constitu-
tional rights, and the incredible breadth of those rights, the arguments
that religious liberty amounts to religious favoritism become less con-
vincing. Religious liberty is an important liberty within the pantheon of
liberties. Religion may not be uniquely special, but it is special. It is spe-
cial enough.
I. SOME FALSE STARTS
Over the years, innumerable arguments have been advanced to justify
singling out the category of religion for distinctive treatment. We start
with two that have pride of place in the literature.
486 [Vol. 103:481
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A. Quid Pro Quo Arguments
The First Amendment singles out religion in two ways: It protects the
free exercise of religion, and it forbids the establishment of religion.
1 6
The former gives special protection to religion; the latter imposes special
disabilities on religion.'7 Quid pro quo arguments defend the Constitu-
tion's special treatment of religion by stressing the internal equilibrium
established by the two provisions. Together the two balance each other
out, like equal weights on a seesaw.
Such arguments are understandably popular, especially in a polarized
culture where one side sees special importance in the Free Exercise
Clause, and the other side sees special importance in the Establishment
Clause.8 Together the Religion Clauses can function as a kind of a bar-
gain, with each side having something to lose if religion is not special. 9
And in the face of increasing skepticism about religious exemptions,
supporters of the Free Exercise Clause have been particularly reliant on
quid pro quo arguments. Those who doubt the worth of the Free Exer-
cise Clause often believe deeply in the Establishment Clause (just as
16 Even this simple statement is not entirely right. As some commentators have noted, the
word "religion" is only used once in the First Amendment, which suggests a unity of purpose
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on
the Separation of Church and State, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 293, 311 (2002) (arguing that "the First
Amendment contains only one religion clause, not wo").
17 See Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 Va. L. Rev. 317, 338
(2011) ("[T]here is a balance between the two Religion Clauses: religion is specially disa-
bled under the Establishment Clause, and it is specially protected under the Free Exercise
Clause.").
18 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates:
Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause Are Stronger When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1701,
1719 (2011) ("In return for keeping religion out of politics and government, politics and
government are barred from interfering with religion .... We can insist that both clauses be
enforced... or we can repudiate a rigorous understanding of both clauses.... [T]he Reli-
gion Clauses stand and fall together."); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling
Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (2000) ("Government may subsidize or promote
any number of ideas, institutions, and activities-such as Planned Parenthood, the 'Got
Milk?' campaign, Mexican Independence Day, or controversial art exhibits-however, it
may not similarly subsidize or promote religion .... If singling out religion were constitu-
tionally problematic, this difference in treatment would be difficult to explain.").
19 It was not always this way. See Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 253, 265 (2009) ("The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
were not a negotiated compromise between two opposing factions. They were the single de-
mand of the dissenting evangelical churches, with the support of some of the deist rational-
ists such as Madison.").
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those who doubt the worth of the Establishment Clause often believe
deeply in the Free Exercise Clause), and it is harder to defend the idea
that religion should be treated specially only for purposes of limiting its
influence.
Quid pro quo arguments help to ensure even-handedness through in-
tellectual consistency, which is no doubt a good thing.2 ° But they never
fully satisfy because they never really answer the question of why reli-
gion should be thought special. They work by assuming that religion is
special for one purpose (say, for Establishment Clause purposes) and
then seeking to establish that religion must then also be special for some
other purpose (say, for Free Exercise Clause purposes). But in this way,
quid pro quo arguments assume the very thing that needs proving-that
religion was indeed special in the first place.
One can see the same thing a different way. Quid pro quo arguments
see the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause as essentially
balancing each other out. But that implies that neither of the two Reli-
gion Clauses would be justified without the other-after all, a seesaw
does not work when all the weight is on one side. Yet this conclusion
feels wrong. The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of-
ten push in the same direction, and I would much rather have either
clause than none at all.21 Some countries, like England, for example,
20 Alan Brownstein has put this well:
When people ask about the singling out and privileging of religion for accommodation
purposes, I always point out that when I defend Establishment Clause principles I re-
ceive similar questions about the unfair singling out of religion for discriminatory
treatment. When people ask about the singling out and discriminatory treatment of re-
ligion under Establishment Clause requirements, I always point out that when I defend
free exercise rights and religious accommodations, I receive similar questions about
the unfair singling out and privileging of religion.... [People] are more willing to ac-
cept broader and more demanding free exercise rights (or discretionary legislative ac-
commodations) and more serious Establishment Clause constraints on subsidies and
displays when they are tied together as a constitutional package than they would be
willing to accept if the operation of either clause is discussed in isolation, standing
alone.
Brownstein, supra note 18, at 1720-21.
2 1 The Establishment Clause certainly protects Free Exercise values. See McCreary Coun-
ty v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("Voluntary religious belief and expression may be as threatened when government akes the
mantle of religion upon itself as when government directly interferes with private religious
practices."). And the Free Exercise Clause protects Establishment Clause values because the
religious pluralism thus enabled acts as a bulwark against religious establishment. See The
Federalist No. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A religious sect may
degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dis-
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seem to have gotten along fine with a Free Exercise Clause but no Es-
tablishment Clause. Yet the quid pro quo position takes that to be the
least defensible option.
Quid pro quo arguments go astray in other ways as well. Such argu-
ments are predicated on one side paying the quid and the other side pay-
ing the quo. The slightly uncomfortable presupposition here is that reli-
gious people are on one side of our society, and nonreligious people are
on the other.2' But there is an even bigger problem here. Two years ago,
in its ministerial-exception case, the Supreme Court held that ministers
cannot bring employment-based claims against their churches. Ten years
before that, the Court had upheld a decision by the state of Washington
to deny a college scholarship to Joshua Davey because Davey was going
to use the money to prepare for the ministry. Both cases rely on religion
being special. The Free Exercise Clause means that ministers cannot
bring suit against their churches; the Establishment Clause means that
the state has a special interest in not funding ministerial education. But
think about this from Joshua Davey's perspective. Because religion is
special, he will not receive state money to help become a minister. And
because religion is special, he will not have employment protections
when he does become a minister. Joshua Davey pays both the quid and
the quo. 3
persed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from
that source.").
On the other side, there are times when the two Clauses push in opposite directions. See,
e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) ("While the two Clauses express com-
plementary values, they often exert conflicting pressures."); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
718 (2004) ("These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are
frequently in tension.").
2 Of course, it greatly oversimplifies things to say that the Free Exercise Clause is for re-
ligious people and the Establishment Clause is for nonreligious people. Believers bring Es-
tablishment Clause claims. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294
(2000) (challenge to school-sponsored prayer brought by Mormon and Catholic families).
And, though this happens less frequently, nonbelievers bring Free Exercise claims. See, e.g.,
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2005) (claims made by an atheist in-
mate to form an atheist study group).
23 Others have rightly pointed to other incongruities between quid and quo that weaken the
force of quid pro quo arguments. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Religion's Specialized Spe-
cialness, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 71, 74 n.18 (2013) ("[A]nother [criticism of the quid
pro quo argument] is that the purported tradeoff doesn't really balance, because the majority
religions that are constrained by the Establishment Clause are not the same as the minority
religions that are protected by the Free Exercise Clause.").
2017] 489
490 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 103:481
And just as there is no necessary connection between who is paying
the quid and who is paying the quo, there is no necessary equality be-
tween the amount of the quid and the amount of the quo. In a sentence
that nicely captures the force of the quid pro quo argument, Jane Ruther-
ford says that "the Establishment Clause is the price religious individu-
als pay for their free exercise exemptions.24 But why should that be the
price? And what exactly is that price? In other words, how much of an
Establishment Clause will free exercise exemptions buy? Are they
enough to purchase an Establishment Clause that forbids coercion? One
that also forbids endorsement? One that even makes religious arguments
inadmissible in public policy? On the flipside, how many religious ex-
emptions are any of these Establishment Clauses worth? There can be no
answer to such questions. There can be no answer to such questions be-
cause (again) quid pro quo arguments provide no answer to the question
of why religion is special. And without an answer to the why question,
we are rudderless in answering derivative questions about when and how
much. For all these reasons, if we want a fully satisfying theory as to
why religion is special, we must look elsewhere.
B. Religious Arguments for Religious Liberty
Another traditional set of arguments for eligious liberty come from a
different place. One can argue for religious liberty in religious terms; re-
ligious liberty might be valuable because religion is valuable. John Gar-
vey lays out the claim straightforwardly:
The best reasons for protecting religious freedom rest on the as-
sumption that religion is a good thing.... [This] is the most con-
vincing explanation for why our society adopted the right to reli-
gious freedom in the first place... [and it is] also the reason why
many, perhaps most, religious believers claim the right to freedom
today. It enables them to perform their religious duties, and to
avoid religious sanctions. It allows them to pursue the truth, as God
gives them to know the truth.
24 Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 Win. & Mary Bill Rts.
J. 303, 350-51 (2001).
25 John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms for? 49, 57 (1996); see also E. Gregory Wallace,
Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 Penn St. L. Rev. 485, 491 (2009)
("Religion requires special constitutional treatment precisely because it involves something
transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive. To sustain a vigorous commitment to reli-
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Others have made similar arguments. "[T]he Free Exercise Clause re-
ally makes no sense," Michael Paulsen argues, "[e]xcept on these essen-
tially religious premises about the reality and priority of God.,26 Greg
Sisk says this insight "in retrospect seems so obvious that it is remarka-
ble that no one ha[s] said it before or at least said it so plainly.
27
Such arguments certainly have historical resonance. "The Religion
then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man," Madison wrote, because "[i]t is the duty of every man to render to
the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable
to him., 21 It is because we have religious duties, Nicholas Wolterstorff
argues, that we come to need rights of religious exercise.29 So when a
society no longer believes in those duties, it no longer has much reason
to hold on to those rights. "If God does not exist, or if we no longer are
willing to grant as our background premise for interpreting and applying
the Religion Clauses the assumption that God exists," Michael Paulsen
concludes, "religious liberty as a rule makes less and less and less
sense."
30
gious freedom, we must revisit and recover the original religious justifications for religious
freedom.").
26 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 Pepp.
L. Rev. 1159, 1185 (2013).
27 Gregory C. Sisk, Stating the Obvious: Protecting Religion for Religion's Sake, 47 Drake
L. Rev. 45, 45 (1998).
28 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, § 1
(1785), reprinted in 5 The Founders' Constitution 82 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds.,
1987).
29 Nicholas Wolterstorff convincingly explains the logical path of this argument, which he
attributes to the Framers generally (and not just to Madison):
All of [the Framers] would have been of the view that we are so related to God that
we have a duty to worship God; worshipping God is not a moral option. I would
guess, indeed, that those who speak of the right to worship God believe that we have
the right because we have the duty; why else, in their way of thinking, would we have
the right?... Furthermore, it is by virtue of nothing more and nothing less than one's
being a human being that one has the duty, and hence the right, to worship God; con-
sequently the right is, as they say, a natural right. And since there is nothing one can
do to get out from under the duty-nothing one can do to shed one's humanity-there
is also nothing one can do to surrender the consequent right.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Freedom of Religious
Exercise, Drawn from American History, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 535, 541 (2001).
30 Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1187. This is where both defenders of free exercise and their
adversaries sometimes meet; it is why Michael Paulsen's review of Brian Leiter's book can
conclude that Leiter is "half right," as both of them believe "[t]here is no convincing secular-
liberal argument for religious liberty." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irra-
tional?. 112 Mich. L. Rev. 1043, 1043 (2014).
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Religious arguments for religious liberty run into difficulty from a
number of directions. The most obvious is worth stating first: Religious
justifications may play well to religious people, but they have little
chance of persuading nonreligious audiences. Frankly they tend to alien-
ate those most in need of persuasion; many nonreligious people already
think of religious freedom as a partisan, self-serving demand, and such
arguments may only confirm their doubts.3'
But religious arguments for religious liberty also run into difficulty
from inside religious faiths. Each religious tradition may naturally think
of itself as special, but there is no necessary reason for one faith to con-
ceive of the others as special.32 And, from this perspective, it is not so
clear what we should do with mistaken religious beliefs.33 After all, if
we accommodate religions because we believe them true, we have little
reason to accommodate religions we deem false. Of course, one could
hedge a bit; one could say that God will allow a certain margin of error
to the earnestly mistaken. Michael Paulsen goes this direction when he
says we should extend toleration to "anything that plausibly could be
thought the true command of God.
34
Such a standard is obviously unworkable, but what makes it unwork-
able gets us to the core of the problem. Religious arguments for eligious
liberty are still, inevitably, religious arguments, which can only be ar-
31 See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313, 316
(1996) ("To those who do not share the relevant religious belief, 'because my religion says
so,' or 'because the Founders' religion said so,' is even less persuasive than 'because the
Constitution says so."').
32 See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version),
21 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 335, 365 (2013) ("[The] theological anchor [of Christian argu-
ments for religious freedom] is an ontological claim about the reality of Jesus Christ embod-
ied in the church on earth, which presumes nothing about the special nature of 'religion."').
33 As Larry Alexander put it:
Religious believers do not view compliance with imagined duties as a good. Rather,
they view compliance with actual duties as a good .... [Religious justifications there-
fore] seek freedom from man's laws only for those following God's laws-those laws
that God has actually laid down, not those that someone might believe He has laid
down.
Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and Impossibility of a Religious Jus-
tification of Free Exercise Exemptions, 47 Drake L. Rev. 35, 40 (1998).
34 Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1169 (emphasis added). Paul Horwitz goes a slightly different
direction in saying that we should tolerate religions because they might be true. See Paul
Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution xix (2011); see also Paul
Horwitz, Permeable Sovereignty and Religious Liberty, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 235, 238 n.25
(2013) (agreeing with reviewers "who have said [his book] is most vulnerable to uncertainty
or attack at the point of implementation of its general theory or approach in specific cases").
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gued about in religious terms. God might be tolerant of false religions,
or God might see a number of religions as true. Or God might be totally
and truculently inflexible. One cannot answer such questions without
some theory of God and God's will for mankind. Religious arguments
for religious liberty both begin and end in theology; there is no other
way to have them.
This is not to discount the value of religious arguments for religious
liberty. Religious communities will continue to debate the merits of reli-
gious toleration, and a case needs to be made there, too. Some religious
people, suffice it to say, do not believe in religious liberty for all. "If
Calvin ever wrote anything in favour of religious liberty," some have
mused, "it was a typographical error." 5 For understandable reasons,
secular audiences usually do not see the debates over religious liberty
happening within religious communities. But such debates are im-
portant, even if they stay entirely within the relevant religious communi-
ty. And although religious arguments for religious liberty are easy to
criticize from the outside, they are impossible to definitively reject. If a
religious believer derives her views of religious toleration from what she
believes about God, then disputing her view amounts to saying she is
wrong about God. Those debates must be left to other people. Such is-
sues are, as the popular saying goes, beyond the scope of this Article.
II. RELIGION IS SPECIAL ENOUGH
The question then is whether religion's specialness can be defended
within a secular paradigm-whether there are sufficient religion-neutral
reasons to support religious liberty. Certainly there is something intui-
tive about this. People often support religious exemptions without sup-
porting the religious belief or practice underlying them. In Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the Court unanimously
protected the use of hoasca in a Brazilian group's religious rituals.36 But
presumably no one on the Court uses hoasca or thinks it efficacious in
worship.
35 Wallace, supra note 25, at 542 (quoting Roland H. Bainton, Introduction to Concerning
Heretics: Whether They Are to Be Persecuted and How They Are to Be Treated: A Collec-
tion of the Opinions of Learned Men Both Ancient and Modem 74 (Sebastian Castellio ed.,
Roland H. Bainton trans., 1935)).
36 546 U.S. 418, 422-23 (2006). For a detailed examination of Gonzales, see Richard W.
Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously: Religious Freedom and the
0 Centro Case, 2005-2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 257.
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Yet instincts are not explanations, and we should investigate the mat-
ter a bit more. In an early piece that has stood the test of time, Douglas
Laycock defends religious liberty as grounded in a conjunction of three
secular propositions:
First, in history that was recent to the American Founders, gov-
ernmental attempts to suppress disapproved religious views had
caused vast human suffering in Europe and in England and similar
suffering on a smaller scale in the colonies that became the United
States....
... Second, beliefs about religion are often of extraordinary im-
portance to the individual-important enough to die for, to suffer
for, to rebel for, to emigrate for, to fight to control the government
for....
**. Third, beliefs at the heart of religion-beliefs about theolo-
gy, liturgy, and church governance-are of little importance to the
civil government.
37
The literature is rich with similar arguments. All kinds of secular jus-
tifications have been pressed for religious liberty. Some of them focus
on the benefits flowing to the people involved. Religious liberty pre-
serves individual identity,38 enables rich associational life,39 enables
37 Laycock, supra note 3 1, at 317 (footnotes omitted).
38 See, e.g., Comelissen, supra note 12, at 92-95 ("[A]re religious beliefs centrally im-
portant to people's identities? Clearly, for some people they are."); see also Eisgruber &
Sager, supra note 10, at 125-26 (discussing the relationship between religion and identity);
John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Is-
sues 275, 275 (1996) (same); William P. Marshall, Truth and the Religion Clauses, 43 De-
Paul L. Rev. 243, 247-48 (1994) (same). The connections between religion and identity are a
deep theme of the work of Tom Berg, Alan Brownstein, and Dan Conkle. See Thomas C.
Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L.
& Soc. Pol'y 206, 213-15 (2010); Alan E. Brownstein, Justifying Free Exercise Rights, 1 U.
St. Thomas L.J. 504, 516-17 (2003); Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Es-
tablishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1113, 1161-92 (1988).
39 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the
Boy Scouts?, 22 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 515, 532 (2007) ("An 'institutional' approach
to the Religion Clauses might proceed from a claim that the values that the First Amendment
is today understood to embody and protect-and, we might usefully refer to this cluster of
goods and values as 'religious freedom'-are well served by a civil-society landscape that is
thick with churches .... ); see also Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly:
Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 949, 951-52 (2004) (discuss-
ing the mediating role of religious associations in society).
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obedience to perceived divine commands,4° protects conscience," and
shields minorities from majoritarian control.42 Others focus on benefits
flowing to society at large. Religious liberty reduces civil strife,43 buffers
the power of the state,4 and encourages civic virtue.45 Still others focus
on the state, grounding religious liberty primarily in distrust of govern-
ment on the particular topic of religion.46
Having said all this, one thing should be obvious. The most plausible
theories of religious liberty will involve multiple values; they will be
pluralistic rather than monistic, federal rather than unitary. If religious
liberty is justified, it is justified for many overlapping reasons. We will
probably not find a single justification for freedom of religion, any more
than we will find a single justification for freedom of speech, or for
criminal punishment, or for a host of other legal practices.
40 See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 11, at 562 ("Disobeying God subjects believers to divine
punishment in the life hereafter; nonbelievers do not fear such punishments because they do
not believe in an extra-temporal existence beyond this life."); see also Cornelissen, supra
note 12, at 95-99 (discussing this argument); Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 1365-67
(same).
41 See, e.g., Bedi, supra note 12, at 244 ("[R]eligious practices are importantly normative
or ethical."); see also Paul Bou-Habib, A Theory of Religious Accommodation, 23 J. Ap-
plied Phil. 109, 117-21 (2006) (same); Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 1373-74 (discussing
this argument).
42 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 38, at 246 ("[R]eligious minorities [might] require special
protections from majoritarian discrimination and illegitimate government regulation because
of their relative political powerlessness and their histories of persecution."); see also Ruther-
ford, supra note 24, at 340-43 (offering a similar argument). For a strong account of this
concern by someone who sees religion as justifiably distinctive, see Thomas C. Berg, Minor-
ity Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 919, 921 (2004).
43 See, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 207 (1991) ("[T]he civil strife rationale suggests that re-
ligious freedom is important in preventing conflict over religious issues."); see also Garvey,
supra note 38, at 280 (discussing this argument); Gedicks, supra note 11, at 563-66 (same);
Marshall, supra note 38, at 248-49 (same).
44 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 11, at 204 ("Intermediate communities such as those fos-
tered by religion provide a valuable buffer between the state and the individual."); Ruther-
ford, supra note 24, at 332 ("One reason to carve out a special role for religion is to help di-
vide power among various factions.").
45 See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 24, at 343-44 ("[R]eligion often offers communitarian
values that emphasize spirituality, nurturing, and social justice in contrast to the market val-
ues that tend to be individual, selfish, and materialistic."); see also Marshall, supra note 38,
at 245 (arguing similarly).
46 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 115, 136 (1992) ("The Religion Clauses were born of distrust of government in matters
of religion, based on experience."); see also Laycock, supra note 31, at 317-18 (arguing sim-
ilarly).
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A piece could be written examining each of these values, and many
pieces have done exactly that. In fact, even critics of religious exemp-
tions offer these kinds of arguments-and it is, in fact, the critics that
merit the most attention, for their criticisms all end in precisely the same
way. After surveying the varied arguments for distinctive treatment of
religion, skeptics conclude that none of these rationales sufficiently
mark out religion as a distinctive category. "Religion," they point out, is
both underinclusive and overinclusive with respect to each of these val-
ues. There is thus a mismatch, the critics note, between the right and the
values that the right purports to serve.
One sees this argument over and over again in the literature. Take, for
example, the first rationale in our list-the argument that religious liber-
ty might help us avoid the kinds of civil strife that would otherwise arise
from governmental interference in religious matters. Gemma Cornelis-
sen points out how this rationale is underinclusive: A lot of things cause
civil strife, not just religious conflict.4 7 Frederick Gedicks points out
how this rationale is overinclusive: We could probably crush tiny reli-
gions without any risk of civil strife.4' The category of "religion" is both
underinclusive and overinclusive to the value of reducing civil strife.
Or take the argument that religious liberty is valuable because it ena-
bles religious believers to follow what they perceive to be divine com-
mands. This rationale is overinclusive: Much of religion has nothing to
do with divine commands. Some religions, like Buddhism, do not have a
concept of divine commands (or even, maybe, a concept of the divine).
And this rationale is simultaneously underinclusive: Believers may suf-
fer intense psychic harm at being unable to follow what they perceive of
as God's commands, but nonbelievers too face psychic harm if they
cannot follow their consciences.49 Most of the various attacks of reli-
gious exemptions share this same basic structure. There is no good rea-
son to single out religious commitments for special protection because
47 See, e.g., Cornelissen, supra note 12, at 89 ("[C]ivil strife is not necessarily more likely
nor more significant when the source of disagreement is religious .... "); see also Ellis, su-
pra note 12, at 222-23 (arguing similarly).
48 See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 11, at 564 ("One major difficulty with this argument is
that it provides no justification for protecting marginal religious groups which government
could easily suppress without any threat to social order."); see also Garvey, supra note 38, at
281 ("If a group is sufficiently small the government can simply stamp it out without run-
nin the risk of civil war.").
49See Gedicks, supra note 11, at 562.
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each possible rationale justifies protecting something somewhat less or
something somewhat more.5°
But all these criticisms suffer from the same problem. And that prob-
lem is simply this: Every constitutional right is this way. Every right is
overinclusive and underinclusive with respect to the values that it pur-
ports to serve; every right involves some degree of mismatch between
the right and its underlying values. Values do not map on to rights in
some one-to-one relationship. Values are widely shared notions applica-
ble to many domains; if a value only applied within the scope of one
particular right, it would not be something we would recognize as a val-
ue.
A single example unpacks all of these points pretty clearly. Take
freedom of speech. One perceived rationale for freedom of speech is its
importance in enabling a well-functioning democracy.51 But freedom of
speech is not the only thing that helps enable democratic decision mak-
ing. Free elections help too. And not all speech contributes to the demo-
cratic nature of our republic. The Court protects pornography as speech,
and there are reasons the Court does so, but it is hardly because of por-
nography's outsized contributions to democratic discourse.52 To put it
more strongly, it is a fool's errand to go searching for possible values
that religion and only religion serves. That is not the way to think about
any constitutional right and not the way to think about religion.53
50 Consider, for example, one piece by William Marshall that illustrates the phenomenon.
See Marshall, supra note 11, at 204 ("Pluralism's attributes, however, do not inhere exclu-
sively within the domain of religious groups."); id. at 205 ("Conscience, as well, is not a
uniquely religious concern."); id. ("[R]eligion is not a unique aspect of self-identity."); id. at
204 ("All of these rationales, however,... serve to equate [religion] with [its] secular coun-
telart rather than distinguish [it].").
"[A]mong the most prominent and widely accepted theories of the First Amendment are
those that explain the Free Speech Clause as either a catalyst for or a protection of democra-
cy itself." Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post's and Meiklejohn's
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1303, 1303 (2009).
52 See Lillian R. BeVier, Where Is the Center of Democracy? A Reply to Professor
Neuborne, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 (1999) ("The belief that pornography is 'democra-
cy-enhancing' is most certainly not what drives the Court's jurisprudence in this area.").
3 Kent Greenawalt put it well years ago in the context of free speech: "Anyone who sup-
poses that the protection of the First Amendment can be reduced to one justification or to
one all-purpose test of coverage is either deluded or willing to sacrifice a great deal in the
interests of theoretical neatness and actual or apparent simplicity of administration." Kent
Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 340 (1989).
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So many have spent so much time trying to find a single characteristic
(or set of characteristics) that can cleanly and perfectly separate (all) re-
ligious commitments from (all) nonreligious commitments and can justi-
fy giving special protection to the religious commitments but not to the
secular ones.4 Maybe it can be done;55 maybe it cannot.56 But it does not
need to be done. Distinctive protections for speech can be justified by
reference to values not distinctive to speech. Distinctive protections for
religion can be justified by reference to values not distinctive to religion.
We must get away from speaking in such absolutist ones. Categories
need not be clean; heightened protections can be justified on the basis of
mere proportions and tendencies. Freedom of speech, strictly speaking,
may be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the flourishing of
democracy; perhaps all that we can really say is that it helps. But that is
enough, and it is enough for freedom of religion as well.
Like other rights, freedom of religion serves a large set of overlapping
values in a messy, imprecise kind of way. But to really see the values
that the Supreme Court sees in freedom of religion, one must encounter
them the way the Court has. After all, the Supreme Court does not arrive
at its legal doctrines through abstract thought alone; it comes to its doc-
trines through the lived experience of having to resolve particular legal
disputes. And, more than anything else, it is that lived experience-the
54 See Leiter, supra note 10, at 26-27 ("If there is a special reason to tolerate religion it has
to be because there are features of religion that warrant toleration ... that all and only reli-
gious beliefs have . . . [or] that other beliefs have . . . but which in these other cases posses-
sion of the features would not warrant principled toleration."); Himma, supra note 12, at 526
(explaining that we must first "identify those properties common to all and only religion that
constitute something as a religion" and then "determine whether those properties, either sin-
gly or jointly, have the kind of moral value that requires, as a matter of morality, legal toler-
ance of religion") (emphasis omitted).
55 Brian Leiter sees religious commitments as distinctive in several respects, most crucially
in that they make categorical demands on action and are insulated from evidence. See Leiter,
supra note 10, at 33-34. Assuming those two characteristics do distinguish religious com-
mitments from others, Leiter seems plainly right that they would not justify distinctive pro-
tections for religious exercise.56 Andrew Koppelman points to literature suggesting that the category of religion cannot
easily be distinguished from secular categories because religion originally developed as a
kind of secular category. See Andrew Koppelman, How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on
Respect for Religion, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 961, 975 (2010) (arguing that the term "religion"
is simply "an anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice of en-
countering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated with geopolitical entities
with which the West was forced to deal").
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Supreme Court's cases themselves-that most clearly illustrates the val-
ues served by religious freedom.
Remember, for example, Wisconsin v. Yoder, the case about the con-
flict between the Amish's way of life and Wisconsin's law that children
attend public school until the age of sixteen.5 7 Or take Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass 'n, the case about a change in federal
land policy that cut off Native American access to their sacred sites.58
Both cases illustrate the powerful communal elements within religions,
as well as the discrete-and-insular status that so many religious minori-
ties share.
When one thinks of conscience, one remembers Thomas v. Review
Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division59-the case involv-
ing the Jehovah's Witness who, because he was a pacifist, refused to
work making tank turrets.60 When one thinks of civic strife, one remem-
bers Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC
and how the ministerial exception arose in part from the Court working
backwards from the idea that this country would never force the Catho-
lic Church to abandon its male-only priesthood, in part because doing so
would rip the country apart.61 When one thinks of governmental mis-
trust, one thinks about Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hia-
leah62-the case involving the Santeria practice of sacrificing animals in
its religious rituals-and how the audience applauded when a city coun-
cilman spoke positively about Cuba's unapologetic persecution of San-
teria practitioners.63 Perhaps the best way to understand the Supreme
Court's often vigorous protection of religious liberty-for, say, the una-
nimity in the Court's recent decisions letting Christian Spiritists use
57 See 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (ruling for the religious claim).
58 See 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (ruling against the religious claim).
9 See 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981).
60 And one cannot help but remember the thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses who for simi-
lar reasons spent World War II in prison. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Ex-
ercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 29 ("The Jehovah's Witnesses did not give up their conscien-
tious objection to wartime alternative service, and five thousand of them spent part of World
War fl in federal prison.").
61 See 565 U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012).
62 See 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
63 The Court concluded that "[t]he minutes and taped excerpts... evidence significant
hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials toward
the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice." Id. at 541.
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hoasca 4 and letting Muslims grow beards in prison65-is through the
cases.
III. FOLDING RELIGION INTO OTHER CATEGORIES
But the critics have another solid argument that requires addressing. If
the best arguments for religious liberty are secular ones, it naturally sug-
gests that the category of protection should be secular as well. Why not
then push the category out so as to go beyond religion, but in such a way
that it still includes religion?
This idea is worth contemplating, but it becomes harder than it first
appears. Several fine scholars have written some wonderful recent piec-
es working with the Establishment Clause in this way, trying to broaden
it out into a sensible, workable, religion-neutral principle. Nelson Tebbe
has worked with the endorsement cases, suggesting that the government
be barred not only from endorsing religious propositions but also from
endorsing certain kinds of secular propositions as well.66 Micah
Schwartzman has worked with the funding cases, suggesting that the
government's inability to fund religious projects should extend to certain
kinds of secular projects.67 Lawrence Sager has worked with the church-
autonomy cases, particularly Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC, suggesting that the government should be
restricted when it intervenes in the internal affairs of secular organiza-
tions just as it is restricted when it intervenes in the internal affairs of
churches. 68 All of these pieces are insightful. But they also all run into
the same problems.
Nelson Tebbe, for example, would bar the government from endors-
ing propositions that impair "full and equal citizenship in a free socie-
ty.,69 But the best examples of his principle are the religious endorse-
ment cases. Tebbe's other examples-like Congress passing a resolution
that "America is a white nation," or an official city campaign to "vote
Democrat"-are usually hypotheticals, sometimes fanciful ones. They
64 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 423.
65 See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
66 See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 648, 650 (2013).
67 See Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 1422.
68 See Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women's Blue Wa-
ter Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty 77, 100-01
(Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
69 See Tebbe, supra note 66, at 651.
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are unlikely to arise and, frankly, if they did arise, they would run into
some doctrinal problems.7 ° Micah Schwartzman would replace the cur-
rent ban on government funding of religious speech with a ban on fund-
ing whenever "the government has no legitimate interest in promoting
that speech.,71 But Schwartzman does not give many concrete examples
of the other things the government cannot fund.
These projects are a success in one sense. We can work to fold reli-
gion into a larger secular category. But the new secular category seems
amorphous, ill-defined, and not much larger than the category of religion
from which we started. All of this seems almost like a gerrymander de-
signed to keep the fruits of the modern Establishment Clause without
having to add too much. One starts these pieces thinking they might
demonstrate that religion is not really special. But one ends them think-
ing they have shown almost the opposite. Religion may not be uniquely
special. But it is a member of a very small set of special things. Or it is a
very large part of a special category that cannot be easily described. Ei-
ther way, we just cannot seem to get far enough away from the feeling
that religion is a remarkably important and distinctive human commit-
ment.
The foregoing deals with arguments on the Establishment Clause side
of things. But this piece is most concerned with issues of free exercise
and religious exemptions. And here one candidate in particular has
emerged as a replacement for the category of religion-conscience.
70 Nelson Tebbe, for example, reasonably suggests that the Constitution should prohibit
government from making the claim that "America is a white nation," just as it forbids the
statement hat "America is a Christian nation." Id. at 649-51. But the doctrinal complication
here is Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), which held that racial stigmatization is not ac-
tionable unless someone is "personally denied equal treatment." Id. at 755 (quoting Heckler
v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)). In turn, Allen formed the basis of an even clear-
er example, United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), which held that only citizens who
live in a racially gerrymandered district have standing to complain about it. The harm to such
plaintiffs was a "representational harm[]"; their voting power had been affected; they had
"been denied equal treatment." Id. at 744-45. A plaintiff living outside the district might be
able to allege stigmatic harm, but "that plaintiff would be asserting only a generalized griev-
ance against governmental conduct of which he or she does not approve" and would have no
suit. Id. at 745.
71 Schwartzman, supra note 17, at 354 (arguing that "taxpayers [should] have an effective
right against compelled support of private or government speech only when the government
has no legitimate interest in promoting that speech").
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Over the years, critics of religious exemptions have often suggested con-
science as an alternative to religion.72
Here, however, we must avoid confusion. Conscience is a loaded
term, with people often meaning very different things by it.73 Not only
have scholars not settled on any single definition of conscience, they
have had trouble even settling on an agreed-upon typology of con-
science. Kent Greenawalt,7 4 Nathan Chapman,75 and Andrew Koppel-
man,76 for example, have all put forth different conceptual frameworks
for understanding the various meanings that "conscience" can take.
However, at the risk of oversimplification, one can array conceptions
of conscience along a kind of spectrum, from the narrowest to the
broadest. Narrower conceptions conceive of conscience strictly in terms
of moral duty,77 while broader conceptions talk more generally about
72 Michael J. Perry, From Religious Freedom to Moral Freedom, 47 San Diego L. Rev.
993, 995-96 (2010); Schwartzman, supra note 10, at 1394. Even some who have ultimately
rejected protections for conscience consider it a better category than religion. See Leiter, su-
pra note 10, at 94 (preferring conscience but fearing that protections for conscience would
"amount to a legalization of anarchy!").
73 See Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev.
1457, 1461 (arguing that, as a consequence, conscience has been "a conceptual muddle");
Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 901, 901 (2010)
("Conscience... has changed its meanings over time and takes on subtly different meanings
in different contexts.") (emphasis omitted); Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Ne-
cessity, and Religious Exemptions, 15 Legal Theory 215, 225 (2009) ("'[C]onscience' has
been a protean notion with different meanings for different people."); Nadia N. Sawicki, The
Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 1389, 1394-95 (2012)
(fearing that although "the idea of conscience is not a difficult one to grasp... [iut may be
impossible to establish a singular and comprehensive definition of conscience").
4 See Greenawalt, supra note 73, at 906-07 (considering, as possible definitions, "(1) an
overarching inclination, (2) an inclination without moral content but one that reflects a per-
son's accepted identity, (3) a perceived personal moral obligation that does not apply to oth-
ers, or (4) a perceived general moral obligation").
75 See Chapman, supra note 73, at 1474-78 (considering, as possible definitions of con-
science, (1) "nonnegotiable ... commands" (2) searches for "life's ultimate concern," (3)
"comprehensive philosophies," and (4) "freedom of thought generally").
76 See Andrew Koppelman, Defending American Religious Neutrality 136-44 (2013)
(considering possibilities of conscience from Aquinas, Locke, Michael McConnell, and Mi-
chael Sandel).
77 This would be Kent Greenawalt's idea of "a perceived personal moral obligation."
Greenawalt, supra note 73, at 906-07. Or Nathan Chapman's idea of "nonnegotia-
ble... commands." Chapman, supra note 73, at 1475. Or the view of conscience Andrew
Koppelman attributes to Michael Sandel. See Koppelman, supra note 76, at 140 ("persons
bound by moral duties they cannot renounce"). For another good description, see Thomas E.
Hill, Jr., Four Conceptions of Conscience, in Integrityand Conscience 13, 14 (Ian Shapiro &
Robert Adams eds., 1998) ("[The] capacity ... to sense or immediately discern that what he
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what gives human lives meaning or purpose.78 We will consider these in
turn. First, taking conscience in the narrower sense of moral conscience,
we will explore whether protections for religion should be discarded in
favor of protections for moral conscience. Second, taking conscience in
a broader sense, we will explore whether protections for religion should
be discarded in favor of protecting something else-something, perhaps,
like the category of deep human commitments.79
A. Religion and Moral Conscience
In discussing the relationship between religion and moral conscience,
we have a natural place to begin. The Supreme Court came face to face
with this issue in two well-known Vietnam-era military draft cases,
United States v. Seeger8° and Welsh v. United States,81 decided five
years apart. Seeger and Welsh each involved a statutory scheme that ex-
empted people from the draft if they could pledge both that they were
conscientiously opposed to war and that their opposition was due to their
"religious training and belief.,82 That last phrase tripped up both Seeger
and Welsh. Seeger and Welsh objected to the war but denied being reli-
gious, and Welsh was particularly insistent regarding that issue. Alt-
hough both ultimately signed the pledge, Seeger put quotation marks
around the word religious, and Welsh crossed the word out.83 The story
or she has done, is doing, or is about to do (or not do) is wrong, bad, and worthy of disap-
proval.").
78 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, for example, speak in terms of "meaning-
giving... commitments." Jocelyn Maclure & Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of
Conscience 12 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty
of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality 19 (2008) ("I shall
argue that the argument for religious liberty ... begins from a special respect for the faculty
in human beings with which they search for life's ultimate meaning.").79 "Deep commitments" is a key phrase in the work of Christopher Eisgruber and Law-
rence Sager. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1245,
1255 (1994) (arguing that religious exemptions "privilege[] religious commitments over oth-
er deep commitments that persons have"); see also Andrew Koppelman, "Religion" As a
Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 San Diego L. Rev. 1079, 1082
n.17 (2014) ("Eisgruber and Sager use that term ['deep commitments'] repeatedly to de-
scribe the claims that should be treated equally with religious ones.").
80 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965).
81 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970).
82 See id. at 336-37 (describing the form that both Welsh and Seeger had to fill out).
83 See id. at 337 ("Seeger could sign only after striking the words 'training and' and put-
ting quotation marks around the word 'religious.' Welsh could sign only after striking the
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ends happily: The Court exempted Seeger and Welsh from the draft. But
the story also ends curiously: It was by construing their objections as re-
ligious in nature, and thus deeming Seeger and Welsh to fall within the
statute's already existing contours, that the Court found a way to protect
them.
84
Seeger and Welsh are helpful because they illustrate several things at
once. To start, they illustrate pretty well why moral conscience is worth
accommodating. Freedom of moral conscience, it turns out, serves many
of the same values served by freedom of religion-among other things,
it can serve to ameliorate psychological distress, reduce civil strife, and
preserve individual identity.85 This is not to claim that freedom of moral
conscience and freedom of religion serve exactly the same values in ex-
actly the same ways. Religion and moral conscience are different things.
They will be backed by different values, or maybe the same values in
different respects and to different degrees. But the whole point of Seeger
and Welsh-the reason why the objectors' claims resonated so heavily
with the Court then and with us now-lies in how they so vividly illus-
trate the deep linkages between religion and moral conscience.
Of course, the category of moral conscience itself runs into issues-
precisely the same issues, in fact, that we discussed earlier in the context
of the category of religion. All the modem attacks on religion as a cate-
gory can also be turned right around and deployed against moral con-
science. After all, the argument would go, why should moral conscience
be singled out for special legal treatment? I might value my family as
deeply as Seeger and Welsh valued their moral consciences. Why should
I have to go off to war when they do not? Viewed this way, the category
of moral conscience can seem just as parochial and indefensible as the
category of religion. But this attack on moral conscience is not persua-
sive for precisely the same reasons why it was not persuasive as regards
religion-namely that this kind of overinclusion and underinclusion is
commonplace with rights and practically unavoidable.
86
words 'my religious training and."'). Similarly, where the form asked them whether they be-
lieved in a Supreme Being, Seeger refused to answer and Welsh checked the "no" box. See
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166; Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd,
398 U.S. 333 (1970). This drove the Court's remark that "Welsh was far more insistent and
explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were religious." Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341.
85See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187-88; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 342-44.
86 See supra notes 38-46 (unpacking the rationales for freedom of religion).
86 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (unpacking these points).
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Although we should protect both religion and moral conscience, still
we must appreciate the two as different things. Neither is a subset of the
other. Seeger and Welsh treated moral conscience as a subset of religion,
which was a conceptual mistake, although perhaps defensible in practi-
cal terms. More often one sees the opposite mistake-thinking of reli-
gion as a subset of moral conscience. This, too, is not quite right. Most
religious behavior has little to do with morality as morality is usually
conceived. People choose to get married in a church, or they send their
kids to religious school, or they go into the ministry.87 Some people may
do those things out of a sense of moral obligation. But for most people,
speaking of those things as moral obligations would be clumsy and jar-
ring. Andrew Koppelman points to a study asking ordinary people why
they attend church-they talk about the importance of communicating
with God, worshipping in a communal setting, and taking the sacra-
ments. Obligation, moral or otherwise, is at the very bottom of the list;
only six percent even list "the Church requires that I attend" as a moti-
vating factor.88
And, to be frank, disastrous consequences are waiting if judges trap
themselves into thinking of religion strictly in terms of moral duty. The
Connecticut Supreme Court once denied a construction permit o a Bud-
dhist group, reasoning that the building of a temple could not be reli-
gious exercise because no tenet of Buddhism required it.89 That kind of
87 Douglas Laycock provides some examples. Courts have said that the process of becom-
ing a minister and the act of praying are not the exercise of religion because they are volun-
tary rather than compulsory. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 883, 893 nn.36-37 (1994) (citing Brandon v. Bd. of
Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (prayer case) and Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind,
771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989) (ministry case)).
88 See Koppelman, supra note 23, at 76 (drawing from Jim Castelli & Joseph Gremillion,
The Emerging Parish: The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Life Since Vatican 11 132 tbl. 11
(1987)); cf. Laycock, supra note 87, at 893 ("This is a thoroughly secular view of religion-
it views God as the great schoolmarm who lays down certain rules, and it defines religion as
obeying those rules.").
89 See Cambodian Buddhist Soc'y v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 941 A.2d 868, 888
(Conn. 2008) (explaining that "building and owning a church is a desirable accessory of
worship, not a fundamental tenet of the [c]ongregation's religious beliefs" (alteration in orig-
inal)). But see Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 755, 755-56 (1999) ("The right to assemble for worship is at the very core of religious
liberty. In every major religious tradition--Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu,
whatever-communities of believers assemble together, at least for shared rituals and usual-
ly for other activities as well.").
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mistake is lamentable and almost laughable, but that is what comes from
thinking of religion as a subset of moral conscience.90
Religion and moral conscience are not nested categories. Instead, they
are overlapping but distinct, like circles in a Venn diagram:
This clarifies things a bit, but it also provides a helpful analogy, for




Our understanding of the interplay between religion and conscience
can benefit from the analogy to speech. Religion and speech are both
constitutionally protected. Religious speech falls into the overlap, but it
does not receive any more protection as a consequence. In fact, to give
religious speech more protection than nonreligious speech would violate
the Free Speech Clause; it would be a prohibited form of content dis-
90 The Supreme Court has never made this mistake. It has always insisted that religious
exercise is what is protected, compulsory or not. In Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, for example, the Supreme Court did not ask whether
the use of peyote was religiously required of the Native American Church plaintiffs. That
was irrelevant. What was relevant was that the use of peyote was part of a religious practice.
See 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (describing the exercise of religion as involving "acts or ab-
stentions ... [that] are engaged in for religious reasons"); id. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("conduct motivated by sincere religious belief'); see also Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (asking whether a practice was "rooted in religious be-
lief'); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("following the precepts of [one's] reli-
gion").
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crimination.9' This is the way that religion and conscience should work
together. Both should be protected. And religious conscience should be
protected, but it should receive no more protection than secular con-
science. That would be discrimination within the protected category of
conscience, akin to recognizing conscience claims by vegetarians but not
by vegans.
If it sounds dramatic to suggest that moral conscience should be pro-
tected, just hold on, for I will say something even more dramatic-that
we may not need any change in law here at all. There is, I submit, a sur-
prisingly solid argument that secular conscience is already protected
both by the Free Exercise Clause and by statutes like the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). This will seem oxymoronic to some,
but the logic is pretty straightforward. Seeger and Welsh interpreted the
concept of religion broadly, in a way that included deep-rooted secular
moral views. Seeger and Welsh did so, of course, in the context of one
particular statute. But these are constitutional-avoidance cases; the Court
expansively interpreted the idea of religion to cover Seeger and Welsh
because it saw genuine constitutional issues in not doing so.92 Seeger
and Welsh thus together suggest hat when the law gives an exemption to
religious conscientious objectors, ecular conscientious objectors with
analogous claims must be exempted too.
And this holds even if one thinks Seeger and Welsh were mistaken.
After all, Seeger and Welsh were settled law at the time Congress passed
RFRA, and legislation presumptively carries forward prior judicial con-
structions of relevant terms.93 Of course, we should not forget the cases
91 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981); see
also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) ("Of course, giving sectarian religious speech preferential access to a fo-
rum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter) would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause (as well as the Free Speech Clause, since it would involve content dis-
crimination).").92 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan accused the Court of pushing the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance too far. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) ("I can-
not subscribe to a wholly emasculated construction of a statute to avoid facing a latent con-
stitutional question, in purported fidelity to the salutary doctrine of avoiding unnecessary
resolution of constitutional issues, a principle to which I fully adhere.").
93 See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997) ("[W]e presume that Congress ex-
pects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents .... ); 2B Sutherland
Statutory Construction § 50:3 (Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer eds., 7th ed. 2012)
("Courts infer also that a federal statute or rule incorporates the established common law
meaning of terms unless the statute or rule otherwise dictates.").
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where the Court suggested secular conscientious objection was not pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause. In Frazee v. Illinois Department of
Employment Security and Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Em-
ployment Security Division, for instance, the Court said that "[o]nly be-
liefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,94 and
Frazee went on to say that "[p]urely secular views do not suffice. '95 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court protected the Amish but suggested Tho-
reau was not protected.96 Undoubtedly Frazee/Thomas/Yoder and See-
ger/Welsh sit in tension with each other, although that tension may have
a pretty simple explanation. Chief Justice Burger wrote Thomas and
Yoder, and Justice White wrote Frazee-and both of them had dissented
in Welsh.
Yet one side probably has the better of the legal arguments here. The
statements in Frazee, Thomas, and Yoder may be striking, but they are
also classic dicta. It is unnecessary, in giving person X an exemption, to
opine why person Y may not deserve an exemption. But the statements
in Seeger and Welsh protecting secular conscientious objection go
straight to the holdings of those cases.
Putting aside the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, there are other
doctrinal possibilities for protecting moral conscience. The Court could
protect moral conscience as a kind of unenumerated right. Although the
Court here has always been fearful of line-drawing problems,97 con-
science may well have the kinds of ties to American history and tradition
that the Court has always demanded from unenumerated rights.98
Even so, it is more likely that exemptions for moral conscience will
grow in a slower and more organic fashion. The most natural first step is
94 Frazee v. Ill. Dep't ofEmp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (quoting Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981)); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
95 Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833.
96 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.").9
7See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("[T]he Court has
always been reluctant o expand the concept of [unenumerated rights through substantive due
process] because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended .... [So we must] exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground."). For more on the various connections between conscience and Ameri-
can law, see Schwartzman, supra note 17, at 359-71 (discussing the interplay of speech and
conscience in parts of the American constitutional tradition).
98 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (arguing that unenumerat-
ed rights must be "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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not some compelling interest test for moral conscience. After all, reli-
gious exemptions did not begin with the compelling interest test of
Sherbert v. Verner and Yoder. They began with narrowly targeted statu-
tory exemptions. Protections for conscience could begin that way too,
and in time evolve into more general protections (like some sort of com-
pelling interest test). Perhaps this has already begun.99
Some worry that exemptions for moral conscience will be unworka-
ble. This fear is understandable, but I do not share it-this is precisely
how religious exemptions seemed to the Supreme Court in the nine-
teenth century. The Court took decades to build up its jurisprudence of
religious liberty. Through the slow accumulation of wisdom that comes
through case-by-case adjudication, our judicial system worked out vari-
ous kinks-the problems of insincere claims, indirect or otherwise in-
substantial burdens, claims that coincide with secular self-interest, and
compelling government interests. Those difficulties, and maybe others,
will have to be worked out if moral conscience is going to work as a cat-
egory. But this is a task worth pursuing.
One thing tending to make exemptions for moral conscience workable
is that there probably will not be many of them. Secular conscience is, in
a sense, the tail of the dog. In the history of America up to this point,
claims of conscience have almost exclusively been religious ones, and
for understandable reasons. Douglas Laycock puts it well: "[Nonbeliev-
ers] do not draw their morality from ancient books written in a radically
different culture that lived with radically different technology and had a
radically different understanding of the world; they do not obey an om-
nipotent, omniscient God whose commands may be beyond human un-
derstanding."100
One could question this. One could wonder if the real reason that sec-
ular conscience claims have not flooded the courts is that secular con-
science is unprotected. After all, no one brings suit when there is no
chance of winning. There is something to this argument, but it faces
some problems. For one thing, Americans are regarded as being famous-
ly litigious, bringing suit even without much chance of success. But
more importantly, again, are Seeger and Welsh-for forty years, we
99 See Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to Kill, 62 Emory L.J. 121, 139-54
(2012) (collecting statutory protections for conscience in various contexts and arguing that
theyL collectively suggest a constitutional right not to kill).




have had Supreme Court precedents making claims of secular con-
science cognizable under the Religion Clauses. And although few such
claims have been made, when they have been brought before courts,
they have sometimes met with success. One high-profile case was de-
cided shortly after Hobby Lobby v. Burwell. In this case-March for Life
v. Burwell-a secular anti-abortion group, March for Life, sought an ex-
emption from the contraceptive mandate, and a federal district court
gave it to them.1 °1 The case has been controversial, but mostly because
religious exemptions in the same context are controversial (i.e., Hobby
Lobby) and because the district judge gave March for Life the total reli-
gious exemption applicable to churches (i.e., where employees end up
without coverage for the disputed contraceptives) rather than the partial
religious exemption applicable to religious non-profits (i.e., where em-
ployees end up with contraceptive coverage from insurers or third-party
administrators).102
Religious people with conscience claims should be treated the same
as nonreligious people with conscience claims. But in so many cases,
there are no analogous nonreligious concerns. One sees this a little in
March for Life itself. Many religious organizations have moral objec-
tions to the contraceptive mandate, but apparently only one nonreligious
organization has the same objections. Yet one sees it even more clearly
in the usual run of free exercise cases. Many religious people have con-
scientious objections to blood transfusions,0 3 to having their pictures on
their drivers' licenses,10 4 or to being clean-shaven.0 5 One has to work
hard to imagine nonreligious people who have moral objections to those
things.
And at this point, we need to ask ourselves: What exactly are we
complaining about? Unfairness to hypothetical people is hypothetical
unfairness; secular conscientious objectors are not devalued by exemp-
tions for religious conscience unless there are comparable claims of sec-
ular conscience that are being denied. If that is happening, I do not know
about it. Andrew Koppelman seems entirely right to me when he la-
ments "[t]his obsession with these improbable marginal cases" of secu-
'0' See 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 120 (D.D.C. 2015).
'02 Id. at 121, 133-34.
103 See Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 143 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
104 See Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478, 478 (1985), aff'g without opinion Quaring v. Pe-
terson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 1984).
105 See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
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lar conscience.106 It is just not clear that there is any problem here that
needs solving.
Religion and moral conscience overlap and serve overlapping values.
But they are also separate and require separate protections. Protections
for moral conscience will in no way remove the needs for protections of
religion or the reasons why we have those protections.
B. Religion and Other Deep Commitments
This debate over religion and conscience gets replicated in a variety
of ways, with all kinds of commitments taking the place of con-
science.10 7 Consider, for example, how Gemma Cornelissen explores the
relationship between religion and identity:
So are religious beliefs centrally important to people's identi-
ties? Clearly for some people they are. However, religious beliefs
are not centrally important for everyone, not even for all followers
of religion. Further, there are other aspects of identity, also giving
rise to beliefs, which may be more important for many people, such
as gender, culture or ethnicity.108
All these points are undeniably true. Religion is an important source
of identity for religious people, but not for everyone. And if identity is a
reason for protecting religion, why not protect identity itself?. At the
most general level, the question becomes this: Religious commitments
may be worthy and valuable commitments, but why should they be sin-
gled out for special treatment when human beings make all kinds of
worthy and valuable commitments?
This idea-that religion is special but that other things might be spe-
cial too-pervades the literature. William Marshall, for example, points
out that "bonds of ethnicity, interpersonal relationships, and social and
political relationships as well as religion may be, and are, integral to an
individual's self-identity."109 Anthony Ellis points out that there is
106 See Koppelman, supra note 23, at 79.
107 Alternatively, one could use the term "conscience" in a broad way so as to include
those kinds of commitments-in this, conscience would be expanded beyond the idea of
moral conscience. See Maclure & Taylor, supra note 78, at 12 (referring to conscience as the
category of "core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments").
1°SCornelissen, supra note 12, at 94 (footnote and citations omitted).
109 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 308, 320-21 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
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no specific guarantee [in the Constitution] of the right to dance, or
play sports, or do science; yet these activities play a tremendously
important role in the lives of many citizens--considerably more
important, in some cases, than does religion in the lives of many
who benefit from the "free exercise" clause of the First Amend-
ment.1 0
The literature on this point goes on and on: Why does the Constitution
protect the free exercise of religion when it does not protect garden-
ing,1  1 or being a Green Bay Packers fan,11" or pigeon breeding?113
Religious believers may think some of these analogies a little insult-
ing, but the converse is equally true: All of this seems somewhat dis-
missive of other parts of our constitutional tradition. Our constitutional
tradition does not protect pigeon breeding, but it does protect a wide va-
riety of deep human commitments. Some of the rights derive plainly
from the text, but much of the Court's work has come in developing
rights found implicit in the text, 14 or even outside the text.'15 And
charged with fleshing out the details, lower courts have naturally gone
further, taking the trunks of Supreme Court opinions and adding boughs,
branches, sprigs, and twigs.
We have reached the point now where virtually everything important
to human beings connects back to the Constitution, with or without a
constitutional text. The Constitution says nothing about marriage or fam-
ily. But the Court has developed all kinds of constitutional rights on the
110 Ellis, supra note 12, at 219.
1' See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom 169 (2014)
("[C]hurches and the profoundly devout might want to retain a constitutional right specially
designed for themselves... [but] gardeners might be pleased to support a constitutional
amendment singling out a 'freedom to garden."').
112 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is Good: Making Sense of Religious
Freedom, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1597, 1601-02 (1997) (reviewing John H. Garvey, What
Are Freedoms For? (1996)) (arguing that, from a secular perspective, there is no good reason
why we should have "constitutional freedom of religious exercise but not a constitutional
freedom to be a supporter of the Green Bay Packers").
113 See Ellis, supra note 12, at 238-39 ("Is there anything that should be especially favored
and burdened in the way that 'religion' is in our constitution? Not, presumably, subjectively
important beliefs merely as such. All sorts of things are subjectively important to peo-
ple, . . . hobbies such as pigeon breeding, for instance .... ").
114 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[I]mplicit in the right to en-
gage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends.").
115 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
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topic-the right of two people to get married,1 6 to have children or
not,117 to keep custody of them absent abuse or neglect, to raise them
as one sees fit," 9 and to keep them in the same household.120 Laurence
Tribe calls this the "dark matter" of our Constitution, and he has written
an eloquent book explaining how "[s]o much of what nearly everyone
understands to be part of our Constitution is nowhere to be found in its
text.",121 If the Free Exercise Clause were the only provision in the Con-
stitution, then defending it would be an ordeal. That really would be sin-
gling out religion. But the Free Exercise Clause is not the only provision
in the Constitution.
This point is worth pressing because so many pieces take this criti-
cism to be decisive. In their very first article on the topic-an article that
presaged a series of fine pieces and a very fine book--Christopher Eis-
gruber and Lawrence Sager offer an offhand sentence that almost per-
fectly summarizes their conceptual starting place, their thesis, and where
they go wrong. "An important theme of this essay," they say, "is that re-
ligion does not exhaust the commitments and passions that move human
beings in deep and valuable ways.' ' lz This sentence is maddening.123 It
is not maddening because it is wrong. It is maddening because it is right.
Of course religious commitments are not the only important commit-
ments human beings have! What person, what religious person even,
would disagree? But dig up this statement and see the corrosive premise
underneath-for religion to deserve constitutional protection, it must be
the only thing that moves human beings in deep and valuable ways. This
is what is false. Religion does not have to be unique in order to deserve
distinctive treatment.
Lurking here unspoken in the dark is a sort of constitutional nihilism.
If our goal is to capture all the deep and valuable ways in which human
116 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (gay couples); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (interracial couples); cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95
(1987) (couples with a spouse incarcerated).
117 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (children);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (not).
118 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
119 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
120 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 (1977).
121 Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution 210 (2008).
122 See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 79, at 1245 n.dd.
123 Such claims, however, are not uncommon. See, e.g., Cornelissen, supra note 12, at 90
("Not every intensely felt belief is religious.").
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beings are moved, every right will be underinclusive toward that end.
Every right becomes as objectionable as the free exercise of religion.
Take the freedoms associated with human sexuality-the right to con-
traceptives, the right of adults to have consensual sex in the home, and
so on. Such freedoms do nothing for asexual persons-people who do
not experience sexual attraction.124 Should they be opposed on that ba-
sis? If I can find one person who finds bowling as moving, as spiritual,
and as existentially fulfilling as you find your marriage, have I under-
mined the constitutional case for marriage? The Civil Rights Act of
1964 offered no protections for age, disability, or sexual orientation.
Should it have been opposed on those grounds?
It is tempting to try to imagine the perfect Constitution, one devoid of
cultural or historical contingencies. Here freedom of religion might be
hard to justify, because of its clear ties to cultural and historical circum-
stance. And there indeed may come a time when the Free Exercise
Clause becomes as obsolete as the Third Amendment. If we all become
atheists, or if we all become Muslims or Christians with precisely the
same theological outlook, there may be no need for religious liberty. But
most of our constitutional categories are the product of this kind of cul-
tural and historical circumstance. We developed our Bill of Rights out of
the abuses of George III; what we borrowed from the English Bill of
Rights came of the abuses of James 11.125
In the context of a written constitution, the way to protect all deep-
and-valuable human commitments is by naming certain specific deep-
and-valuable commitments. There is no other way. We start with the
ones we know, and we keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not
the only deep-and-valuable human commitment. But it is one of them,
and that is enough. And this sentiment, of course, is not revolutionary. In
fact, it just returns us to where we started fifty years ago, when the Court
first considered the case for and against religious exemptions. Sherbert
v. Verner involved a Seventh-Day Adventist denied unemployment
compensation because her religious convictions forbidding labor on her
Sabbath (Saturday) did not amount to "good cause" for turning down
124See Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 306 (2014)
("Asexuality has thus far received no attention in the legal literature. The Article therefore
presents a careful examination of the emergence of asexuality as a conceptual and cultural
phenomenon.").
125 See English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., 2d sess., c. 2, 16 Dec. 1689.
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work in the eyes of the South Carolina Supreme Court.126 Sherbert did
not imply that religion was the only good cause for turning down work;
Sherbert implied only that religion was a good cause-one of many
conceivable good causes.127 Religious exemptions began in the United
States as a particularized kind of hardship exemption, and that is what
they are today.
IV. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
This brings us to the last issue considered here-the issue of exemp-
tions. Religion may deserve some kind of special treatment, but exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws seem an extreme form for religious
liberty to take.
There are a couple of preliminary points to make here. The first is
that, here too, religion is not as special as it seems. Justice Scalia fa-
mously called religious exemptions a "constitutional anomaly";128 he
claimed that the Court did not make exemptions to generally applicable
laws for speech.129 But Justice Scalia had forgotten about Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell3 ° and a score of other cases.13 1 When put in situa-
tions where exceptions from generally applicable laws are necessary to
126 374 U.S. at 401.
127 See id. at 400 n.3 (noting that, under South Carolina's statutory scheme, unemployed
workers were not disqualified from benefits if they had "good cause" for failing to apply or
accept suitable work).
128 See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990) ("[A]
private right to ignore generally applicable laws.., is a constitutional anomaly."). Seven
years later, Justice Kennedy repeated the charge. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
513 (1997) (calling "a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability" an
"anomaly in the law").
129 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 ("[G]enerally applicable laws unconcerned with regulating
speech that have the effect of interfering with speech do not thereby become subject to com-
pelling-interest analysis under the First Amendment.").
130 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
131 See Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 387-88 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (denying the Jaycees an exemption from state antidiscrimina-
tion law, but only because the state's interest was deemed sufficiently compelling). Douglas
Laycock pointed this out first and went over many of the cases in detail. See Laycock, supra
note 60, at 18-21. A few other cases can be found in Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normal-
ized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 Ind. L.J. 77, 94 n.63 (2000).
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protect speech, the Court makes them-and it has been making them for
fifty years now."'
Speech is the best example because there the Court's jurisprudence is
pretty robust. But speech too is not special, or at least not entirely spe-
cial. Abortion rights also involve exemptions, at least on occasion.
Women who have abortions cannot be sued by their male partners for
emotional distress.13 3 Such claims would end up acting as a kind of
spousal-consent requirement, which the Court held unconstitutional for-
ty years ago.134 Abortion clinics have sometimes been given immunity
from generally applicable tort law; women who regret their abortions
cannot sue the clinics in wrongful-death actions premised on an alleged
lack of informed consent.' As with speech, rarely does the right to
abortion necessitate exemptions from generally applicable laws. But it
happens when the situation calls for it.
This point should not be pushed too far. Religious exemptions are dif-
ferent than speech exemptions and abortion exemptions-maybe in
kind, certainly in degree. Other rights occasionally involve exemptions,
but exemptions are the central issue with free exercise. Yet this turns out
to be mostly a matter of mutatis mutandis--exemptions make sense for
132 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
133 In hearing such a case, Judge Posner put it well: "[W]e do not see how, as a matter of
either legal logic or common sense, the constitutional right of a woman to have an abortion
without interference from the man who impregnated her can coexist with a constitutional
right of the man to interfere." Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir. 1998).
Apparently, the earliest case presenting this fact pattern was Przybyla v. Przybyla, which
dismissed an ex-husband's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against his for-
mer wife for having an abortion. 275 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) ("We hold that
the intentional exercise by a woman and her physician of her right to terminate her pregnan-
cy as protected by the United States Constitution, cannot constitute conduct that is so ex-
treme and outrageous that it meets the [requirement for intentional infliction of emotional
distress].").
134 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (holding spousal
notification unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood f Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71
(1976) (holding spousal consent unconstitutional).
135 See, e.g., Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (dismissing various claims against an abortion clinic, including wrongful death, negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, and alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Act); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007) (dismissing
wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress claims).
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religious exercise because of a number of things particular to religion,
religious freedom, and modem government. 
136
Religious exemptions have a logic of their own, but that logic may be
most clearly seen from a historical perspective, because history makes
clear the difficulty of maintaining genuine religious pluralism any other
way. Religious freedom did not start with religious exemptions. The
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War be-
tween Protestants and Catholics, was not primarily about religious liber-
ty-it was primarily about ending the bloodshed caused by the religious
fragmentation sparked by the Reformation.137 People had died and killed
for their faiths in ways and in numbers that undermined the basic stabil-
ity of society. The Peace of Westphalia was about peace, first and fore-
most. To restore that peace, the subsequent regime of cuius regio eius
religio ("whose realm, his religion") worked largely through geograph-
ical separation. Catholics and Protestants lived together mostly by living
apart; each group got its own separate lands, and those who found them-
selves on the wrong side of the line had to leave, hide, convert, or face
the consequences.138
This worked for a while, as state churches sought to maintain reli-
gious uniformity with coercive means across Western Europe. But even-
tually, this too became unsatisfactory. Too many people either found
themselves or put themselves on the wrong side of the relevant geo-
graphical lines. There were too many non-Anglicans in Anglican Brit-
ain, too many Protestants in Catholic France and Spain, and too many
Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics in the wrong parts of what we
would now call Germany. They would not convert, they did not leave,
and they either chose not to hide or could not do so well enough.
139
136 See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 17 (2000) (referring to
"mutatis mutandis" as "[a]ll necessary changes having been made" (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 1039 (7th ed. 1999))).
137 See Peace Treaty Between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and Their
Respective Allies [Treaty of Westphalia], Oct. 24, 1648, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_
century/westphal.asp [https://perma.cc/7BEL-9LP3].
138 For more on the functioning of the Peace of Westphalia, see Harold J. Berman, Law
and Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradi-
tion 61-62 (2003). See also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism,
75 Fordham L. Rev. 769, 790 (2006) (noting how "the Westphalian Peace [still] had the lib-
eral virtue of preserving at least some space for some reasonable differences of opinion on
public issues while avoiding civil war").
139 Steven Smith once put it succinctly: "The cuius regio eius religio approach proved to
be an untenable solution; not all subjects could be induced to accept the religion of the
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The Peace of Westphalia hinged on the elimination of religious plu-
ralism. But when religious pluralism became irreversible in practice, the
promised peace threatened to evaporate. Of course, rulers might care not
a fig about religious dissenters. But nevertheless, they knew that crush-
ing dissenters might tear at the social fabric, endanger foreign relations,
and drain the public fisc. A primitive form of religious toleration was a
possible solution, as exemplified by France's Edict of Nantes in 1598
and England's Toleration Act in 1688.140 Religious minorities, or at least
those thought less threatening, could practice their religions openly. But
this was just religious toleration; it was not religious liberty. It was
simply an acknowledgment hat the costs of state-imposed religious uni-
formity sometimes exceeded the benefits.
This kind of religious toleration was thin, and there was much back-
sliding, but it paved the way for religious exemptions.14 ' Toleration
made sense because of the high costs of religious persecution. But if re-
ligious groups needed religious exemptions, and were willing to suffer
persecution without them, then a state that refused exemptions would
have to engage in the very persecution that tolerance was meant to
avoid. Tolerance led to exemptions because the benefits of tolerance
could not be realized without exemptions. 1
42
This story could be told in many ways, but take the case of Jews in
England. Shortly after the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury, Jews were allowed to return to England after almost four centuries
of legal expulsion. But on any realistic account of the matter, Jews
would not be able to live in England if they could not meet together for
worship, hold property, or sue or testify in court. This meant exempting
Jews from the ban on religious assemblies,14 1 from having to include the
prince." Steven D. Smith, The Plight of the Secular Paradigm, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1409,
1436 (2013).
140 For an overview of the Edict of Nantes, the Toleration Act, and subsequent develop-
ments in England and France, see Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The
Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1385, 1401-14
(providing this history as backdrop to church-state relations in the American colonies).
141 The Edict of Nantes, for example, was revoked in 1685 by the Edict of Fontainebleau.
See Hills, supra note 138, at 790 (noting how "Louis XIV repealed the Edict of Nantes and
expelled his Huguenot population in an effort to obtain religious uniformity in his popula-
tion").
142 For a similar account of the overarching history, see Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism,
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. Detroit Mercy L. Rev. 407, 407-11 (2011).
143 Religious assemblies-apart from those of the Church of England-of more than five
people were banned under the Conventicle Act of 1664. When a number of Jewish leaders
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phrase "on the true faith of a Christian" when swearing the Oath of Ab-
juration (which was required in order to register land title), 144 and from
having to swear on the New Testament in order to sue or testify in
court.145 Initially, exemptions were informal and post hoc, largely to
handle exigencies. But eventually, Parliament began thinking about reli-
gious dissenters on the front end. In 1753, when Parliament codified its
rules on legal marriage officially to require that couples be married in
Anglican churches in accordance with Anglican canons, it ex ante ex-
empted Jews and Quakers. 
146
These exemptions-being exemptions from specifically religious re-
quirements-have an air of obviousness about them. Jews obviously
could not be expected to swear Christian oaths or to attend Christian
worship, because to tolerate Jews was precisely to tolerate that they were
not Christian. But that is probably more important to us now than it was
to them then. Governments at that time saw religious requirements as
important for secular reasons. Religious exemptions from religious re-
quirements could threaten the state's legitimate interests as much reli-
gious exemptions from other kinds of requirements. So the former natu-
rally led to the latter. Quakers started off asking for exemptions from
church taxes and religious oaths, but they ended up, at least in some
places, getting exemptions from the draft. Douglas Laycock puts the
central point well:
Religious exemptions from regulation naturally followed the new
commitment to toleration because toleration was illusory without
them. It did little good to refrain from prosecuting Quakers for
identifying as Quakers, only to prosecute them instead for perform-
ing the religious obligations of Quakers.
147
All this should ring true for modem readers, who fully appreciate how
woodenly formalistic the status/conduct distinction can be. We take it
almost for granted that you do not tolerate a group of people if you fail
were later indicted, the Crown stepped into stop the proceedings. See Cecil Roth, A History
of the Jews in England 170-71, 180-81 (1946).
144 This happened in 1723. See David S. Katz, The Jews in the History of England: 1485-
1850, at 238 (1994).
145 Robeley v. Langston (1667) 84 Eng. Rep. 196 (KB).
146 The history of legal marriage in England is well covered in R (Hodkin) v. Registrar-
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77, [6]-[8], [10], [13] (appeal taken
from EWHC).
147 Laycock, supra note 142, at 410.
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to tolerate the things that make them a group.148 This may not be true as
a matter of formal logic, but it is a practical reality.1
49
Religious exemptions are not new; they have been around for centu-
ies. The debate over the compelling interest test is relatively new, but
that is a separate issue. Now of course the historical practice was mixed;
religious exemptions were often denied and for a variety of reasons. But
we are fundamentally in the same place now as we were at the Found-
ing-sometimes religious exemptions make sense, and sometimes they
do not.
What has changed is the scale of the problem. In the eighteenth centu-
ry, Protestant denominations dominated. Religious controversies cen-
tered on narrow issues of belief and doctrine-issues so narrow, in fact,
that modem audiences have trouble even understanding what the fuss
was about. Government did much less; the federal government did al-
most nothing that might even inadvertently affect religion. So the issue
of religious exemptions rarely came up. Fast-forward two centuries, and
every part of that has changed: The number of religious denominations
has grown; the differences between religious groups have widened; the
variety of religious practices has greatly increased; and the changes on
the other side of the ledger have been even more dramatic--our modem
twenty-first-century regulatory state bears almost no resemblance to
America in 1787.150
This is simultaneously the argument for exemptions and the argument
against them. The more conflicts there are between legal obligation and
religious faith, the more need there is for a system of accommodation
and the more that system of accommodation can seem unworkable. Em-
ployment Division v. Smith took the latter side of this debate.151 Congress
148 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) ("When homosexual conduct is made
criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject
homosexual persons to discrimination .... ).
149 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) ("A tax on
wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.").
150 See Horwitz, supra note 34, at xiv.
151 See 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) ("Any society adopting such a [compelling interest test]
would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's di-
versity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precise-
ly because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable re-
ligious preference and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we
cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objec-
tor, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order." (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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and state legislatures took the former, ameliorating Smith with a set of
supplemental rules-RFRA,15 2 the Religious Land Use and Institutional-
ized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"),' 53 and state RFRAs.154 But in many plac-
es, formal neutrality remains both the floor and the ceiling.
Formal neutrality is worse than it sounds when it comes to religion.
Smith has sometimes been thought of as Washington v. Davis15 applied
to religious liberty. The analogy is true in a way; it can help students
learning the doctrine. But the analogy misses something important:
Washington v. Davis is bad for racial minorities, but Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith is bad for religious minorities in a different way.
Formal neutrality works poorly in the racial context because the races
start in unequal places--dramatically unequal places. But if the races
started from the same position, formal neutrality would work decently
well as a constitutional rule. This is because people of different races
tend to want the same things. They want good jobs; they want to get into
good colleges. This is what sets up the familiar claim of unfairness in the
affirmative-action cases.156 But people of different religions want such
different things that formally neutral rules cannot ever be anticipated to
have neutral effects. A ban on peyote means nothing to Catholics or
Jews. But it means everything to members of the Native American
Church.
It is also fatuous to compare Smith's conception of neutrality with the
speech rules of content and viewpoint neutrality. Most regulations of
speech end up directing speech into certain channels. They prohibit
speech in certain places, or at certain times, or in certain ways. But they
leave other opportunities for speech open. Maybe you cannot
protest abortion in front of the doctor's house157 or in front of the clin-
152 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)).
153 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012)).
154 For an examination of state RFRAs, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2010).
155 426 U.S. 229 (1976). For a thoughtful critique of Davis, see Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L.
Rev. 317, 317-28 (1987).
156 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (U.S. June 23, 2016); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244
(2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
157 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 474-77 (1988).
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ic.158 You may have to keep your protests relatively quiet,159 you will not
be able to trespass or block entrances,6 ° and there will be limits on your
being able to deceive people.1 6' But there still are innumerable ways for
you to protest abortion and to try and convince your fellow citizens not
to do it. Yet in the context of Free Exercise, "alternative channels" for
the exercise of the right do not matter in the same way. It is one thing if
a warden tells a prisoner that he does not need books in his cell because
he can read them in the prison library. It is an entirely different thing if a
warden tells a Jewish inmate that he does not need a Kosher meal be-
cause he can wear a yarmulke. The latter does not even make sense.
CONCLUSION
Critics may see this piece as a failure on the grounds that it has not
convincingly demonstrated its core claim-that religion really is special
enough. After all, to truly prove such a claim, one would need some
generalized theory about what makes things special enough-about
when, in general, attributes of human beings are sufficiently distinctive
to warrant distinctive constitutional treatment. Such a theory would then
be tested by its ability to yield consistent results across the full range of
human concerns.
But if this piece ends disappointingly, so too do the many criticisms
of religion's specialness, for they too offer no generalizable theory about
when things are special. They criticize religion for being insufficiently
special; they point out the mismatch between the category of religion
and some of the values that freedom of religion serves. But such criti-
cisms could be made of virtually every constitutional right (and often
are). And if no generalized theory is possible, then neither side in this
debate will ever have a knockout punch. Maybe that is how things must
be.
158 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525, 2541 (2014) (remanded for further
proceedings).
159 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78, 89 (1949).
160 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 286 (1993).
161 The issue here, which is still ongoing, centers on organizations that offer pregnancy
counseling but do not refer clients for abortions. Cities have passed ordinances requiring
such organizations to so inform clients. See Evergreen Ass'n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d
233, 233-44 (2d Cir. 2014); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 722 F.3d 184, 186 (4th
Cir. 2013); O'Brien v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 768 F. Supp. 2d 804, 807-08, 814 (D.
Md. 2011).
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This brings to mind a final Supreme Court case that is central to this
issue, yet almost never discussed-Walz v. Tax Commission.162 Walz is
so valuable because it presents the whole debate over religion's special-
ness in miniature. At issue in Walz were property-tax exemptions given
by New York City. New York exempted property used for religious pur-
poses from tax. But it also exempted property used for a variety of other
purposes--charitable purposes, educational purposes, scientific purpos-
es, literary purposes, and so on.163 Walz ended up rejecting the Estab-
lishment Clause claim, and the concurring opinions of Justice Brennan
and Justice Harlan did so largely on the basis of those other exemp-
tions. 164
The modem debate over religion's specialness, in a way, mirrors the
debate in Walz. The distinctive protections for religion in Walz were part
and parcel of a system that protected a wide variety of important human
activities. So it is with the Constitution. The Constitution protects reli-
gious freedom alongside a number of other freedoms-the right to speak
freely, to own a gun, to have an abortion, to enter into contracts, to hold
property, to marry the person of one's choice, to be treated equally on
the basis of a variety of characteristics, and to be given due process.
When one considers the variety of constitutional rights, and the breadth
of those rights, the arguments that religious liberty amounts to a kind of
religious favoritism become less convincing. Religious liberty is an im-
portant liberty within the pantheon of liberties. Religion may not be
uniquely special, but it does not have to be. Religion is special enough.
162 See 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
163 Id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("New York exempts real property owned by a
corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of
men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital,
infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical socie-
ty, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes, for the enforcement of laws relating to
children or animals, or for two or more such purposes." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
164 Id. at 687 (stressing that "a range of other private, nonprofit organizations" are exempt-
ed); id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring) (similar); see also Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S.
1, 12 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("The breadth of New York's property tax exemption [in
Walz] was essential to our holding that it was not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or sup-
porting religion." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2017]

